

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 12

23 November 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

1. The Inspector General, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, spoke to Agency personnel at the Twelfth Agency Orientation Course on 6 November 1953.

2. It is believed that Mr. Kirkpatrick's remarks and his answers to questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.

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MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Attachment: 1

Distribution AB

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Security Information

REMARKS OF
MR. LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
AT THE
TWELFTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE
6 NOVEMBER 1953

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I should like to talk only briefly about the Office of the Inspector General, and then I will devote most of my time to talking about a subject which is very close to my heart, a career in the Central Intelligence Agency, a subject with which I am sure all of you are concerned.

As to the Office of the Inspector General. Let us be quite frank about it and say that in a good organization or in a small, compact organization the necessity for an Inspector General does not exist, and I hope that some day, perhaps through some of my efforts, we can achieve that result in this Agency. This Agency has gone through a period of rapid growth--a growth which, by the way, was not so much of our doing as of other governmental agencies which wanted us to do many things in many parts of the world, some far beyond our capabilities--and it became very large in a very short time. As many of you may realize, we are now going through a period of stability, in which we are regrouping, reorganizing, stabilizing, getting our organization set down and developing ourselves professionally to the degree where we will probably rank, in short order, with the best intelligence services in the world. However, we did grow too fast and some of the problems that come to the Office of the Inspector General are the result of too rapid growth.

What the IG's office does in CIA is very briefly two things: First, it is my objective, with a very small staff, to perform at least once a year an inspection of every single component of the Agency. Inasmuch as this is the first year in which inspection has been performed, we will be much more thorough than in later years. In these inspections it will be our objective to see that the component which we are inspecting is operating within the jurisdiction of appropriate directives, is doing the job competently, is well organized, has its personnel well in hand, has good personnel management, handles its money properly and, in other words, is a sound part of the organization.

I report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence and, therefore, the Inspector General's reports go to the Director. However, it is my policy in reporting on a component to give the head of that component, generally

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the Deputy concerned, a chance to read the report before it goes to the Director, so that if he has any strong dissenting opinion as to the facts produced or the recommendations made, the Director will have the opportunity to review his comments simultaneously with my comments.

The second part of the IG's office is perhaps of more importance to you individually. We are open always to any individual in the organization who has any problems on which he cannot gain redress through the appropriate channels. I would like to stress that there are appropriate channels open to you, whether you have a personal problem or whether you have an official problem. But if you cannot solve your problem, if you become overly frustrated in trying to get it done through official channels, if you seem to run into a stone wall and feel that there is a problem there which should be taken up, the doors of the Inspector General's office are open at all times; and it is understood by all of the supervisors in this Agency that there will be no unfavorable reflection on anyone coming to the IG. I am there to listen, and in case I cannot see you personally, I have two able assistants who will be glad to see you, and we will be glad to do what we can to assist you. In certain instances we may be able to, but remember that bureaucracy in government is a great and complex organization, and we are not always able to cut the red tape or the organizational roadblocks which may be in your way.

Now, let us talk about career service. The very first question which I would like to answer is: "Why should the Agency have a career service which in any way differs from the rest of the Federal Government; why should it differ from Civil Service; are we a privileged group over and above any others?" The answer as far as "privileged group" is concerned is, of course, "no"; but the answer as far as the Agency is concerned is a very strong "yes." And it is "yes" because we have perhaps the gravest responsibility of any group of individuals in the Federal Government. It is not the Army or the Navy or the Air Force with all due respect to the men in those services who are the first line of defense; it is the intelligence service. And the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force will come into combat only if the intelligence service fails. If our information is not sufficiently good, if our coverage of the world is not sufficiently accurate, if we fail to get advance indications of hostilities or of actions inimical to this country, then the military services will have to come in and pick up where we dropped the ball. Consequently, the first reason why there should be a career service is that we have a grave and important responsibility to our nation; the second, that we have authority and responsibilities given to us by the Congress, by mandate to the Director of Central Intelligence, over and beyond any other government agency in the United States, and over and beyond any authority or responsibility ever given to any other government agency in the history of this country. Obviously, the Director, himself, cannot fulfill these obligations and responsibilities personally and must delegate them to practically each and every individual in the Agency. With these responsibilities and obligations it is vital that we have the highest-calibre people in this Agency that it is possible to have.

The third reason we should have a career service is that intelligence is a profession, a profession which is not easily acquired. We as a nation have always been, perhaps, as far behind as any power has been in the intelligence profession; only in recent years with the creation of the first Central Intelligence Group, and then with the creation of this Agency by Federal statute, have we started to catch up to the other great powers. We have a great distance to go to catch up. We have made amazing strides in the years since World War II but we have a large and sinister enemy in the Soviet Union and, perhaps, the most capable enemy that this country has ever faced in the field of intelligence and intelligence operations--sinister, ruthless, amoral, and with nearly all of the assets and abilities that we can put into the same field. Consequently, the intelligence officer who is brought into this Agency needs training, needs experience, and needs a broadening which only time and strenuous effort can give.

And, finally, the fourth and last reason for a career service is that it is extremely important that we encourage everybody entering this Agency to plan to make it a lifetime career and profession for security reasons and for reasons of cost.

As IG, switching rapidly to the other hat, I would like to say to you to remember always that the dollar you are spending as an employee of CIA is your own as a taxpayer and that it should be used with discretion whether you are writing a cable, typing up a memorandum, or engaging in an operation.

And it is very important from a security point of view that we have as small a turnover in personnel as we possibly can. Regardless of what the job of the individual is in an intelligence organization, he obviously acquires a certain amount of information as to its work, its assets, its capabilities, its competence, its knowledge; and the more people that enter this Agency and leave it after a short time, the more information about the work of this Agency there is outside of the Agency. I say that without impugning the motives of the individuals who are forced to leave the organization for personal reasons or for professional reasons, because we recognize that they are loyal and able American citizens or they would not have been here in the first place. Yet, regardless of how discreet an individual is, or how careful he or she may be after leaving the Agency, the security barrier is gone--we no longer have the daily knowledge of security by seeing guards on the doors, by having to lock papers at night. And, consequently, little by little the information about the work of the Agency starts to get out.

I am sure that all of you have heard about career service, and I am also sure that many of you are skeptical about what this Agency is doing about career service. So let me give you a very quick historical outline and tell you what is going on today.

The Career Service Program, as such, started under General Smith in 1951. He organized a CIA Career Service Board to study the problem and come up with recommendations as to what should be done. That Board was composed of

Deputy Directors and Assistant Directors. They set up eight task forces on which individuals, through the level of Division Chief, were represented to study all of the problems that were necessary in order to establish a career service. Some of those problems were rotation of jobs, transfer between different components of the Agency, liberalized retirement benefits, medical benefits for dependents, tenure of office, job security, and so on down the line; all of the important factors that you are interested in as a career employee.

These task forces met on a weekly basis over a period of about a year, and they came up with voluminous studies covering each and every factor which affects your career. When the final report was submitted to General Smith, he established a CIA Career Service Board which was composed of the Deputy Directors, the Director of Training, the Assistant Director for Communications, and two representatives from each of the Deputies' areas on the Assistant Director level. That Board exists basically as constituted to this day.

Then each of the components of the Agency, each of the offices, established its own Career Service Board, and I might just say that some of them have worked exceedingly well. I would like to pay high tribute to the Career Service Board of the Office of Communications. It is one of the best organized and best operating in the Agency. Others have worked less well. The motivation on the part of some for establishing a career service and working toward this end has not been as great as others.

I would like to add parenthetically that I think the system as we have it today is a little cumbersome. It involves the work of too many high-level officials over too great a time. I think that in the very near future we will come up with a plan for streamlining and simplifying it, and for getting to what I think is the real basis for career service. This is the planning for each of your careers over a period from ten to fifteen years and talking over with you the plan for your career, insuring that it is in accordance with your desires and your aptitudes, and then launching you forward on that career so that you will know that today you are going to hold such and such a job; then, perhaps, you will transfer to another office to broaden your basis of knowledge and experience, and then you will return to your own offices; then, perhaps, you will have a period of six months of training with the Office of Training, and so on down the line over a period of years, in order that you can project your career ahead. I also envisage a board which will screen not only applicants coming into the Agency but also individuals when they pass through their probationary period in career service and perhaps later at a date when specialists and executive-type individuals will be put in the proper patterns for their future. I feel very strongly that each and everyone of us has different characteristics, different capabilities and different types of aptitude that should be developed for the best interests of the Agency.

25X1A9A I would like to tell you of some of the things that are going on currently. In addition to the regular meetings of all of the Career Service Boards, we have under the very able leadership of [] of the Office of Training,

a Women's Panel which has been meeting for some three months and is studying the problems affecting women's careers in this Agency and seeing what should be done to ensure that women can make just as much of a career and go just as far forward as men can in CIA.

We have a Junior Officers' Panel which is studying the problems peculiar to junior officers--grade levels of say five up to nine--to see what should be done to ensure that they can make a better career in the Agency than exists today.

We have a Legislative Task Force studying all of the problems of career service to see what we should go to the Congress to ask for in order that our career service can be the equal of any in the Federal Government, offer the same benefits and, incidentally, the same obligations. I think all of you should recognize that you cannot be on a one-way street as far as a career is concerned. If you are to have retirement benefits, if the Agency is to look after you in sickness and health, you must also recognize that the Agency expects from you an obligation to serve, to stay with the Agency over a career, and to give it the best possible out of your professional abilities.

Then we have a Writing Task Force which is important from your point of view, because I have so many comments like this: "I don't really know what career service is." We have a group preparing a booklet which I hope will be issued to you by the end of this year telling you exactly what career service means to you, what your benefits are, and all of the details as to training, retirement, and so forth.

That is, in essence, a very quick thumbnail sketch of a very large amount of work that is being done. We are trying to make sure that it reflects, not the official views of the Division Chiefs or the Assistant Directors, but the official views of every individual working for the Agency.

If you have problems on career service which are not adequately covered today, I urge you to submit them, preferably in writing, to your Career Service Board, and it will surely forward them up to the CIA Board if there are questions which it cannot answer.

In conclusion, there is just one word which I would like to say. The objective of the CIA Career Service Program is extremely simple. It is to make the Central Intelligence Agency not only the best place to work in the Federal Government but also to make it the Agency that attracts the most qualified and the best individuals for this type of work throughout our entire country.

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Question: Is there any conflict between the function of your office and that of Organization and Management which is under DD/A? Do not the responsibilities of O & M also include inspection of offices and activities?

Answer: Yes, that is quite true. But the delineation between the Office of the Inspector General and that of Organization and Management is that O & M is here basically to be of assistance to the offices with respect to organization and in the solving of their management problems, and the IG is here more as an arbitrator--to take the burden off the Director and the Deputy Director in working out jurisdictional disputes which cannot otherwise be worked out.

Question: How does the career service affect typists, secretaries, and semi-professional people?

Answer: It affects them in the same way as it affects anybody else in the Career Service Program. If they are here to make a career in the Agency and indicate this, it will give them the benefit of a job security which it will not give to individuals who are here on a short period of time. Of course, we obviously cannot interfere with matrimony or motherhood, which are two of the largest causes of the ladies leaving us, but it is still quite important from a security point of view as well as from a straight cost point of view to keep our turnover down as much as possible. Consequently, the Career Service Program will encompass the clerical and semi-professional people just as thoroughly as it does professional people.

Question: Is the lack of a college education a hindrance to advancement within CIA? Is the career program, for which many of us were hired, going to work to our advantage even if we do not have advanced degrees?

Answer: You will be judged in CIA strictly upon your abilities and your qualifications regardless of whether you have a college degree or not. As far as advanced degrees are concerned, if you are in CIA and doing a job, your advancement will be based not upon the degrees that you hold but upon the job that you are doing and upon your qualifications to advance to another job. If there is any action to the contrary, as Inspector General, I would be glad to examine the case.

Question: What about rotation between Offices in the Agency in Washington and rotation between overseas and Washington?

Answer: Rotation is one of our most serious problems today. It is a very difficult job, indeed, to preserve compartmentation, which is absolutely essential in every intelligence agency; and also, simultaneously to encourage rotation because you get a certain amount of resistance to rotation. It is, I think, simply a matter of more education because we have a system of rotation from your office to a training site to another office and back to your own office, which should broaden your career. I think it is mainly a matter of maturing our career service. As far as overseas and Washington is concerned, that is almost strictly within the one area of the DD/P, and I think that in itself can be worked out with time. Today, I am very distressed by the fact that some individuals come back and do what I think is a very invidious thing which is forced upon them, and that is, shop for jobs.

I think we can stop that in short order and when they come back, well before they come back, they will know what their future assignment will be.

Question: Is there any tendency toward setting up a specific period of time for work in an overt position within the Agency before applying for a position on the clandestine side?

Answer: Basically speaking, that is the opposite of the normal way. It is much preferable to move from the covert to the overt side, but there is absolutely no reason for not moving in the other direction provided you go into a staff job where the fact that you were overt and may be identified with CIA is not detrimental to your work on the covert side.

Question: Since CIA is putting emphasis on improving the calibre of its employees, has any regulation been put into effect to enable CIA to dismiss employees for incompetence or mediocrity?

Answer: This does not require a regulation, basically. There is an established system in the personnel procedures, an established method for eliminating incompetent or mediocre employees. That is through the Personnel Evaluation Report. This is something in which I am extremely interested because, to be very honest about it, it has never worked well in the past. It has never worked well because we are all human beings and we do not like to call a fellow in and say, "Well look, Joe, you haven't been doing too well and we're giving you an unsatisfactory efficiency report." You probably know him and you probably know he has a wife and children and when he gets that news, it is going to raise certain mental anguish, if not greater than that. But basically speaking, that is the way it has to work. If we are going to have a highly qualified service with only the best people in it, unhappily there will be those who get evaluation reports indicating that they are not on a level with their fellow employees. Those evaluation reports must be discussed with each individual before they are accepted. The individual must be told what his weaknesses are and only then can the procedures be implemented for his elimination or resignation from the Agency.

Question: Do we have a retirement system tied in with present planning? Has anything been done about a twenty-year retirement law for CIA people?

Answer: The answer to both of those questions is "yes." We have, of course, an existing retirement system. We are all under the Civil Service Retirement System which actually is quite a liberal one. As far as a twenty-year retirement for service of a particular nature, that would have to be enacted by legislation.

Question: Because of the economy wave, do you anticipate any RIF's--Reductions in Force--in our Agency?

Answer: There will be none, as far as we know today. We obviously cannot predict the future actions of Congress, and we will have to be very careful

on expansion either in our expenditures or in the use of personnel, but as far as RIF's are concerned, I certainly think that we will avoid them if we possibly can.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

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NUMBER 11


23 November 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of General Charles P. Cabell

1. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Charles P. Cabell, spoke to Agency personnel at the Twelfth Agency Orientation Course on 3 November 1953.

2. It is believed that General Cabell's remarks will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.



MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

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Attachment: 1

Distribution AB

REMARKS OF
GENERAL CHARLES P. CABELL
AT THE
TWELFTH ORIENTATION COURSE

3 November 1953

Six months ago I addressed the Tenth Agency Orientation Course. I then gave my impressions of CIA as it looked to me after a very short period as a part of the Agency. It has been a useful and necessary exercise on my part to take stock after six months, and maybe you too will be interested in the results. So, let us take another look at those first impressions to see how, if at all, they have changed.

At the time of that previous talk last May, I had actually been a full-fledged official of CIA only a matter of days, although before being sworn in, I had spent about two months being briefed by individuals from all parts of the various elements of the Agency. I pointed out that I had been struck by the great devotion to duty displayed by all of those to whom I had talked in CIA, and remarked on the absence of "clock watchers" and people just filling in time. My closer association with the people in CIA has reinforced that first impression. It has confirmed to my satisfaction their unusually high motivation. I don't believe that I have ever seen a group more dedicated to the tasks that face them and more selfless in their desire to serve and get their jobs done. Their willingness to work as long as necessary to complete the assignment that is before them, to revise and refine, time after time, in order that the product shall represent the very best of which they are capable; that is the good, solid foundation that this Agency has developed and it will permit continuing development throughout the coming years.

As the Old-Timers among you will know, CIA has had its full share of reorganizations. In 1952 we had our last major reorganization--the one that put in their present form the components of the Agency with which you are familiar: the DD/P, the DD/I, and the DD/A, the Office of Training and the Office of Communications. We have now lived with this organization for over a year, and while there have been necessary minor changes and adjustments, it has proved itself to be sound and workable. It is unlikely that there will be any major upheavals in the foreseeable future. There will, however, be changes. We cannot stagnate. Once we settle down and say, "This is perfect and no further improvements can be made," then we have come to a standstill and have lost the ability to grow and progress. What is even more important, the Director and I are very much aware that there are weaknesses which

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only careful administrative readjustments and better practices can do away with, and we intend to take all the steps that we can to secure their correction. We can, therefore, expect to see minor changes here and there in both organization and administration.

Looking back again to what I said last May, I voiced my enthusiasm about taking over my job. I looked upon it as a most important job, one that presented a tremendous challenge. With six months of it behind me, dealing intimately with the problems of this Agency and working closely with its members, I can see very clearly that "I didn't know the half of it." This is an organization that deals with many facets of government activity. The straight intelligence side I had been familiar with for years as Director of Intelligence for the Air Force, and as Director of the Joint Staff. It is an activity that has long interested me very much. The special operations side was one with which I was almost completely unfamiliar, but about which I am learning more and more as time goes on. It is impossible to stress too strongly the importance of accurate and timely strategic intelligence. The decisions reached by the President and the National Security Council must be based on something more than educated guesses. It is our job to produce the necessary information, properly evaluated, which will enable the heads of this government to make important foreign policy decisions. That intelligence must be scrupulously worked up to ensure its accuracy. Furthermore, it must be timely. A piece of intelligence otherwise perfectly done and completely accurate is no good, if it arrives too late to be used. As for special operations, I am learning about the infinite care and ingenuity that go into their planning and execution. But then we cannot talk about them!

I am particularly pleased to see the new people of the organization who are coming along to do the work. Originally we had to depend on some of the old hands from OSS, Army, Navy, Air Intelligence, and State to get the "know how" so necessary in intelligence work. We are now, through our own training program, developing new professionally trained officers, both men and women, who are well equipped to join this profession. We have produced, and are continuing to produce, intelligence officers with a combination of training and experience, who can be counted upon to make sound judgments, produce solid intelligence estimates, and carry out effective operations.

We have gone to some lengths to set up a Career Service Board to ensure that our people are most advantageously placed from their point of view and ours, that their service is well rounded, and that they have a chance to develop themselves to the utmost. At the same time an effective Career Service Program will assure those who are best suited to this type of work that, in continuing in it, they will have before them a good solid professional career in government. They will have a

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career of which they can be justly proud, both because of the growing recognition of the significance of their contribution to the national welfare, and because of the inner satisfactions which come from doing a job that one knows to be important. But this career service goal imposes on us, as an Agency, another responsibility: We must be highly selective in our recruitment of new people. The very process of clearing applicants weeds out a great many. It is pretty much the case of "Many are called but few are chosen." Those of you who have been chosen, therefore, represent the cream of the crop, and we already have an investment in you. As such you are a force to be carefully trained and nourished in what has already become the tradition of U. S. Intelligence. And we speak proudly of this developing tradition. Because you have been carefully chosen, you on your side have the responsibility of seizing every opportunity to increase your own fitness for the job that is before you.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 10

23 November 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of Allen W. Dulles

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles, spoke to Agency personnel at the Twelfth Agency Orientation Course on 6 November 1953.

2. It is believed that Mr. Dulles' remarks and his answers to questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.

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MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Attachment: 1

Distribution AB

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Security Information

REMARKS OF

MR. ALLEN W. DULLES

AT THE

TWELFTH ORIENTATION COURSE

6 November 1953

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There are just one or two things I want to say. This is really a half-hour in which you talk to me rather than a half-hour in which I make an address.

I have no major reorganizations in mind. The only kind of reorganization I contemplate is a general tightening up and, as time and attrition take their toll, a slight reduction in numbers here in Washington. I think our headquarters should be smaller and our work in the field expanded. We have placed upon us from time to time new tasks and new responsibilities which require additional personnel. In certain areas additional personnel will be required in the field. This will demand of us here in headquarters more efficiency, more performance, and possibly--and this is a headquarters problem--more concentration on the main targets, the main responsibilities, and the most important issues of the day.

What we are seeking in our Agency is quality, devotion and performance. Intelligence can never become an assembly-line type of work. For its success it depends upon the character, ability and hard work of the individual, and no type of organization and no machinery that we install can take the place of that. In the last few months we have had some signal accomplishments, and I have had occasion to be very, very proud of a considerable number of individuals who have had an opportunity to show their mettle and have come through with success.

I have often mentioned my own experience during the war. I arrived in Switzerland in November of 1942 just at the time the curtain came down, and I had no chance to add substantially to my staff. Starting with a small group which was increased by local people whom I found on the spot, I built up an organization which had to concentrate only on certain essential operations. And I found that by and large during the first two years when I was unable to build up a large organization, I was able to do more effective work than when the curtain was raised and I had quite a flood of people.

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I am setting aside an afternoon each week to get around the Agency and to meet with you and talk with you and learn of your own problems and see how the work is being done. I hope to visit all of you in your various lines of work so that before twelve months are up I will have accomplished a complete personal on-the-spot survey. I may not thereby have the answers to all the problems, but I will have a better knowledge of your problems and difficulties, a better knowledge of the Agency, and a better knowledge of you personally.

CIA remains somewhat in the spotlight. I would like to see us stay out of the papers as much as possible. We will probably never stay completely out; but we have to be, to some extent, an anonymous agency. It is the most difficult thing in the world, I think, for a human being to do interesting work, to achieve interesting and significant results and not be able to tell them to the world, and sometimes not even to his own family or friends. And I realize the problem; I have it myself. You will all have it to some extent, but if we are going to succeed, we will have to resist the temptation to talk about what we are doing.

Our relations with other parts of the Government are steadily improving. In the intelligence community, State, Army, Navy, Air, the Joint Chiefs, Atomic Energy Committee, the FBI, all are working together as a team as we never have worked before. There is room for improvement but our present relations are quite satisfactory.

Every Thursday morning when the National Security Council meets, I, or in my absence General Cabell, have the opportunity to brief the National Security Council on the important intelligence developments of the week. This is becoming fixed as a governmental procedure and it gives us an opportunity at the very highest level to present quickly to the leaders in Government, including the President, a sketch of the situation from the intelligence angle. I consider these briefings a trust to exercise, not only on behalf of CIA, but also of the entire intelligence community.

In intelligence today, we face the most difficult task that any intelligence community has ever faced. The Iron Curtain is a reality and a real problem insofar as the procurement of intelligence is concerned. To meet that problem will require more ingenuity and more skill than intelligence agencies have shown in the past. Yet, if we do not meet it, we will not have fulfilled the vital mission we have. We are having a measure of success. The measure of success must be greatly increased in the weeks and months ahead. This is a very real challenge. It is because of the nature of the challenge that we must concentrate on building, on a career basis, individual skills and techniques backed by the greatest improvements available in technical, mechanical and scientific aids. I was greatly gratified recently to see in our Technical Services

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Staff that on the technical-mechanical side we are preparing, for you who will be the operators in that field, the most modern techniques to meet the modern problems of intelligence.

Since I place much emphasis, in fact the top emphasis, upon individual capabilities, I realize that the training programs that Matt Baird and his associates have set up here are a vital and essential part of our work. I had to learn my intelligence background by the case method, and I sometimes wish I could go through the training that you are having.

From this you will realize how much stress I put on protecting you in your jobs and in the opportunities which open to you a future of absorbing interests and of vital importance to the nation. I want you to know that that is my chief concern and I won't let you down.

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Question: What influence do you, as Director of Central Intelligence, have in formulating U.S. policy?

Answer: Policy should be based upon facts. It is our responsibility, in coordination with the other intelligence agencies of the Government, to lay before the National Security Council the facts of given situations. If policy makers propose to base their policy on facts they ought to listen to us and, in general, they do; but I have no absolute control. I cannot force them to take our estimate of a situation as the basis for their policies. I can say generally that a very great respect is shown to the reports and estimates which we present.

Question: Do you believe that Congress will set up a special committee for Intelligence Agencies or for CIA matters?

Answer: Senator Mansfield has introduced a resolution for a Committee on Intelligence that is comparable to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the House and the Senate. There is no clear-cut decision as yet. It may be considered, to some extent, at the present session of the Congress. At the moment it seems to me that existing machinery is adequate to bring before the appropriate committees of Congress the essential facts of what we are doing. If the Congress feels that more is needed, naturally we ought to cooperate in giving it the information that it requires within the bounds of the security which is essential for our operations.

Question: As the Director of Central Intelligence, are you ever consulted on the budgets of the departmental intelligence agencies?

Answer: You can realize that this is rather a difficult and delicate problem for I do not desire to be placed in the position of censor of the expenditures of other agencies although it is my duty under the law to provide a measure of coordination in the intelligence field, to endeavor to prevent duplication by the various agencies, and to try to see that the area is adequately covered by the agency most competent to cover it. I doubt, however, whether I should go into the question of whether the amount of money spent by other agencies in carrying out their intelligence mission should be left at my doorstep.

Question: What is your view regarding the administrative separation of the overt side of the Agency from the covert side in the interests of security and efficiency?

Answer: I think the present administrative arrangement is functioning quite well. We have the overt administration and then we have an Administrative Officer on the covert side, who protects the security of the covert side and maintains necessary liaison with the overt administration. Nothing is perfect in as complicated an organization as we have, but I think this arrangement is pretty satisfactory.

Question: In the past, new and high-ranking operations officers, who have had no previous interest or experience in language, area, or intelligence, have been brought aboard and have been set above career officers of known ability. What is the career management doing about these "political appointees?"

Answer: Since I have been associated with this Agency, and that means even before I became Director, nobody, as far as I know, has been appointed to the Agency for political reasons or under political pressure. If there has been anyone, I don't know the person and I doubt whether the assertion can be documented. I wish the person who asked this question would kindly give the Inspector General--it can be done anonymously--the names of those persons; the Inspector General and I will handle that situation entirely alone; and I may report on it the next time I speak here. But I doubt the assertion. I don't believe it's true.

Question: May we be so optimistic as to look forward to a new building in about three years?

Answer: I hope so. We become involved in the problem of dispersal when we consider a new building. Too wide dispersal would seriously affect our efficiency because of the close relationship we have to the Pentagon, the State Department, and other organizations of government. And, therefore, I think it would be rather difficult for us to accept a dispersal that would take us far away from Washington. We are working very hard on the question of a building. It is at the present time under consideration by the Bureau of the Budget.

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Security Information

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

file

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 9

8 October 1953


SUBJECT: Remarks of Charles P. Cabell

1. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Charles P. Cabell, spoke to Agency personnel at the Eleventh Agency Orientation Course on 4 August 1953.

2. It is believed that General Cabell's remarks and his answers to questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.

25X1A9A



MATTHEW DAIRD

Director of Training

Attachment: 1

Distribution AB

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REMARKS OF
CHARLES P. CABELL
AT THE
ELEVENTH ORIENTATION COURSE
4 AUGUST 1953

* * * * *

There is something a little unusual about this particular gathering which may have escaped your immediate attention. Gathered here in this auditorium today are members of the Agency representing all its parts as well as members of some of our cooperating agencies in the intelligence community. I say this is unusual because in your career with this Agency you will seldom have the opportunity of sitting down in one body with fellow CIA workers from the whole operation. If you will look at the people on your right and on your left, I will lay odds you will see faces that you will not see again during your entire experience with us. Now this is an unfortunate thing in a way, because it means that as an Agency, we can not always enjoy that comradeship which comes from continuous contact and interchange within a group, the size of this one. We are in fact compartmented, and however unfortunate it may be, this is inevitable in an essentially covert organization. There are two reasons for this, the latter of which particularly applies to Central Intelligence.

The first is the very understandable reason of efficiency. In any extensive and complex process like making automobiles, running a railroad or a university, governing a great commonwealth, or producing intelligence, efficiency demands a division of labor. We produce so much that we must have many people on the job. It is far more efficient to have each person become a specialist so that he does those things he is best capable of doing in order to make his contribution to the whole. Now the development of this concept of division of labor is one of the most important contributions which the American genius has given to the world of industry. It is equally applicable to the field of government and thus to CIA. We find ourselves organized into offices, divisions, branches, and desks so that we can properly take advantage of this division of labor. Unfortunately, this means that the individual who works on one small aspect of a piece of intelligence seldom gets to see the whole picture, and more than that, he seldom comes into contact with others who contribute to the same piece of intelligence. This kind of compartmentation, although it keeps us apart and keeps us from seeing things whole, also helps us to operate efficiently.

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There is another and a special reason why we are compartmented in this Agency. That is the reason of security. You have all had or will have security indoctrinations which stress the need to know. As CIA has grown, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the sort of security upon which successful intelligence depends. I mean by that, immunity from having our secrets known, not only abroad but also across the hall in an adjacent office. For security reasons, we allow an individual to know only those portions of our business which he needs to know in order to do his job effectively. Inevitably this means that we have security fences between the different parts of our Agency, security fences which again are a part of compartmentation.

Now both efficient division of labor and the maintenance of security are important and useful devices. But they can be dangerous to the ultimate attainment of our objectives if they are abused because of exclusiveness, jealousy, false pride, or thoughtlessness. Then, instead of resulting in boundary lines dictated by considerations of efficiency and security, there will be barriers hampering the speedy and effective production of intelligence. The only counter-measure that I know which can overcome the inherent disadvantages of compartmentation is coordination.

Now, coordination is a term of which you may have already heard a great deal in your experience in government and you will hear a great deal more of it as time goes on. My definition of it means simply taking into account the responsibilities and the capabilities of all those involved in any particular decision, operation, or piece of intelligence production. This has almost come to be a dogma in the intelligence community. You know, for instance, that the intelligence which CIA produces is the product not alone of its own efforts but also of the efforts of intelligence operations in other departments and agencies of the government. After some experience in intelligence before coming to CIA, and as Director of the Joint Staff, I have become convinced that there is no danger of over-emphasizing coordination. Rather we have got to stress it even more than in the past in order to achieve an effectively functioning intelligence community. This would be a community in which the resources of the whole could be geared through a process of coordination to satisfy the highest demands of policy for sound intelligence, without breaking down the boundaries which efficiency and security have erected between our agencies.

If coordination is important in the intelligence community at large, it is equally important in the specific part of the intelligence community in which you are engaged. In my experience I have seen too many instances where bureaucratic subdivisions and false conceptions of security have had the effect of hampering smooth operation of the activity, and I am determined that as rapidly as these come to light here, they will be eliminated. Without in any sense overlooking the importance of either the efficient organization of a complex operation like ours or the high importance of maintaining security between its operational units, I still insist that we keep our eye on the ultimate goal of greater and more effective contributions

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to policy makers. After all, that is why we exist, and anything which obstructs our attainment of this objective is to be avoided. Where there is a will for coordination, it will be rare indeed where a way cannot be found to effect coordination and still follow the dictates of sound security. In the final analysis there may be specific occasions when complete coordination will turn out to be incompatible with security requirements. But the burden of proof will be on the individual bypassing the particular step in the coordination process.

There is one more aspect of coordination upon which I want to say a word. That is the development of adequate coordination between what we call our customers and ourselves. Our customers, of course, are those whose policy and operating decisions demand sound intelligence. It is a self-evident fact which can escape no one in the age of commercials that the customer's wants and needs must be known to the producer and the distributor if the customer is to be adequately served. The same thing certainly applies to the field of intelligence. We must know what the policy makers want, and we must try in every way we can to see that this want is adequately met. This cannot be done in a vacuum. It can only be done as a result of close coordination between our policy makers and our intelligence producers. They must be frank with us as to what they need and we must as frankly tell them what we can do and what we cannot do. This is a two-way street, but just as we must know what the customers want, so also we are obliged in the customer's interest, of course, to do a little bit of advertising. I mean that we must convince the policy makers that sound decisions require sound intelligence and that before fundamental decisions are made, recourse should be had to the intelligence community. I trust we will always be ready to come up with a useful answer if not a perfect one. But the process is not complete, even then. If custom-built intelligence is to be the most useful, the producer of it needs to be called in by the customer to sit with him in counsel while that intelligence is being integrated with other factors to form a decision. And the fact that the Director of Central Intelligence regularly sits as an adviser to the National Security Council is a recognition of this need and is thus one of the most encouraging features of the current organizations and practices for national security.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

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TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 8

8 October 1953


SUBJECT: Remarks of Allen W. Dulles

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles, spoke to Agency personnel at the Eleventh Agency Orientation Course on 7 August 1953.

2. It is believed that Mr. Dulles' remarks and his answers to questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.

3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.

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MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Attachment: 1

Distribution AB

REMARKS OF
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES
AT THE
ELEVENTH ORIENTATION COURSE

7 AUGUST 1953

* * * * *

There's one advantage of being Director over being Deputy Director. When I was Deputy Director I was supposed to come here and make a long speech. I still have to make a speech but it can be shorter and I can come to get your questions and your ideas and be as helpful as I can in answering them. I have gained a good deal from your questions in the past, and I'll do my best to answer any that you have today. As you know, we have in the Agency the Office of Inspector General with one of our ablest career men in that job. Before I came here today I asked him if he had any objection to my advertising his office a bit, and he said, "No. My door is open at any time to anyone in the Agency." He and I work together very closely and any especially difficult problems that you put to him will always come to my attention.

We have been a bit in the spotlight recently--for my money, far too much. In our form of government, given the character of the American people, it is probably essential, probably inevitable that we should have more spotlight than a secret intelligence agency ought to have. It is right, in a way, and certainly understandable, that there should be inquiries, that people should want to know something about what we are doing. I've always felt it was very wise that the authors of the law setting up this Agency provided us with an umbrella of overt activities under which we could cover the more secret operations. I hope the fact that I've had a little bit too much spotlight, will not lead others to seek it. I think we can do our work better without it.

We do have certain problems these days. There is, as you all know, and rightly, a strong trend toward economy. Economy in Government means economy in money; it means economy in personnel. It means, in effect, that we will have to do a better job, probably with less money and with fewer people--and this means that all of us from the top down will have to be more highly trained. From now on we will have to put added emphasis on training, because it may be that in many parts of our Agency one man or one woman will have to do the work of two. I don't really regret this. Over these difficult weeks when our budget has been under consideration, we have had full and fair consideration by the members of Congress concerned. They have a pretty hard time of it because there is no Agency of Government for which it is more difficult to make appropriations, and where it is more difficult for those who are attempting to prune the budget to know

where they can rightfully prune. The members of the committee expressed that difficulty but they left it very largely to us, within the limits they prescribed, to do our own pruning--to select the wheat from the chaff--to try to do the things which are most essential and do them most efficiently.

We have for this coming year a budget within which we can operate and, I believe, operate effectively. We have, in effect, certain personnel ceilings which are not going to be easy to keep, but I am confident that within those ceilings we can do our work.

I remember an experience I had with personnel ceilings when I was assigned to Switzerland in the days of the OSS in November of 1942. I arrived in Switzerland as the last American to enter legally before the curtain came down at the time of the landing in North Africa and the occupation of the southern part of France. Events imposed a ceiling on my staff and nothing could be done about it, since no one could legally get into Switzerland from that time on and work with me officially.

Well, I was able to search around in other government departments, and by finding Americans in Switzerland, it was possible to put together a small, a very small establishment. But for about a year and a half I had to work without any reinforcements. That imposed upon me a great measure of selectivity, and very fortunately in a way, for I could not write long dispatches since everything had to be enciphered and sent through the air. I had to restrain any tendencies toward verbosity. The selectivity forced upon me resulted in my doing far better work during those eighteen months than I did after the frontier opened up. Thereafter, because of the notoriety which Switzerland had as a center from which so-called glamorous operations could be carried out, a flood of people descended upon me, whereupon I became an administrator rather than an intelligence officer. And I hope that throughout the Agency, while we need administrators and must have them, we'll be able to cut down the number of administrators and really build up the number of top intelligence officers--men and women--on our staff. We can only do it through training, through building up a Career Service.

The longer I'm in this work the more convinced I am that it is a highly personalized affair. It's not the amount of money we have; it's not the number of projects we have; it is the skill and the devotion of the individual. I consider it my duty to protect and defend the assets that have been already put together: the magnificent work General "Beedle" Smith did in getting this Agency along the way, the work of his predecessors, the work done by predecessor organizations, and the work Matt Baird is doing in training the new arrivals. All this has meant that we have gathered together in this Agency men and women of whom I am sincerely proud, and I want you to know that in the performance of your duty you can always look to me to stand up for you and back you when you're in the right.

Question: How do you evaluate our present intelligence output? Are you satisfied with it?

Answer: I don't think in intelligence one should ever be satisfied. If we are, we are lying down on the job. I am highly satisfied with the manner in which the subjects are presented to me and the briefings that are given to me within the limits of the intelligence that we have. We don't have enough intelligence, however, on the major targets. I might just describe a little of our work with the NSC, which is the highest policy-making body in government within the field of national security and foreign problems. It meets, you know, on Thursday morning, under the chairmanship of the President, with the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization as regular members. Then on specific topics of interest to any other department of government, the head of that particular agency meets with the Council. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence serve as advisers on matters of military policy and intelligence, respectively. The usual procedure is for the Director of Central Intelligence, or my Deputy in my absence, to brief the Council on the intelligence background of matters that are coming before the Council or are on the agenda for the Council that day; and, in addition, to raise any urgent matters where an intelligence briefing is deemed necessary. If there is nothing that has transpired during that particular week which seems to me urgent enough to bring to the attention of the Council, I generally restrict the intelligence briefing to the particular subjects before the Council, occupying ten to fifteen minutes generally--sometimes, with a very intricate topic, up to half an hour. Subject to my own failings and shortcomings, I think the procedure is working satisfactorily.

Question: Does CIA suggest policy?

Answer: I've tried to keep the Agency out of policy. If we espoused a policy, the tendency would be to shape our intelligence to fit the policy. In my briefings I always keep out of policy. I've had this situation arise, though, at the National Security Council: if I present some situation that is critical, where something should be done, there is quite a tendency around the table to say, "Well, what should you do about it; what would you do about it?" Well, then I refer to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, whoever it may be, pass the buck to him--very possibly because I haven't got the answer myself.

Question: We have read much about the possibility of the establishment of a joint committee on Central Intelligence something akin to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Do you believe Congress will set up such a committee and what do you think of the idea?

Answer: I rarely speculate as to what the Congress will do, and I think it is probably unwise to do so. This is a matter, however, which I have discussed with certain of the leaders in Congress, and I propose

to discuss it further when Congress reassembles, presumably next January. At the present time the practical situation is that we report, on matters which are of concern to Congress, to the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and the House, and on matters relating to the budget, to the Appropriations Committees. Those arrangements are working satisfactorily and I would assume that they will continue. The problem of a new committee has, I think, been raised and will be studied in order possibly to protect the Agency from having to report to a multiplicity of committees. Such protection, of course, would be helpful. I am not clear in my mind, however, that a committee of the size now proposed would be the most effective way of doing it, but this question will be approached with an open mind by us here and, I believe, also by the members of the Congress.

Question: What, in your estimation, would happen to our Agency in time of total war?

Answer: It would probably grow, we'd have new problems, and in areas of military operations there would come into effect a new relationship between the Agency and the American Commander-in-Chief in the field. That has all been worked out in a satisfactory way which would protect the integrity of the organization but at the same time adapt it to war conditions in the field.

Question: Are you satisfied with the present structure throughout the Agency or do you contemplate reorganization?

Answer: I do not contemplate any more reorganization at the moment. I think it is wise to work with the organization we have--to give it a chance and only reorganize as we see particular needs. I do find that in certain areas some of the key men are overworked, particularly with the added assignments that we've had to take over because of the activities of the NSC Planning Board, the Psychological Strategy Board and its proposed successor. That may require certain added personnel on the top echelon. Apart from this I have no plans for reorganization.

Question: Is the possible transfer of the Paramilitary Function, to the Department of Defense still under consideration?

Answer: No. There is some consideration being given to the transfer of one very limited activist segment of that, where we really get out of the PM field into what is more nearly the functions of Defense, but that will not involve, in any way, a turnover of that whole function. That is rightfully, and under NSC directives, a part of the function of this Agency. But what is being transferred is at the urgent request of CIA; it is not being wrenched from us. I would like to turn this over; in fact I have tried for about a year to turn over this one particular small segment of work in the field.

Question: As a part of the Career Service Program, do you think it's a good idea to have rotation between overseas intelligence officers and those from the Washington offices--ORR, OCI, etc.?

Answer: Yes, I do, and I think it is a very useful thing for those in ORR, OCI, OSI, and so forth, to have periods of duty on the covert side and then have duty in the field, and that is being done. Apart from this, there are certain stations, particularly London, Frankfurt, and others, where there are representatives of the overt offices already--and quite a large number--so that to go into the overt offices does not necessarily preclude or exclude the possibility of working in the foreign field.

Question: In answer to a question posed at the last Orientation Program regarding discrimination against women, has anything been done? And has the Inspector General made a report on alleged discrimination against women?

Answer: The Inspector General has, through the CIA Career Service Board, made an official pronouncement that there shall be no discrimination against women in the Agency. Also, we had a meeting a little while ago with a selected group representing the distaff side, and Kirkpatrick and I sat down and went into the problem. I was glad to find that a dozen or fifteen of the ladies sitting around the table did not seem to feel that there was discrimination. If there is any evidence of discrimination, I want it brought to Mr. Kirkpatrick's attention and to mine. We are looking into that problem because I am not clear in my own mind that we have taken full advantage of the capabilities of women. I'm going to work on that some more.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 7

30 June 1953

SUBJECT: Remarks of Allen W. Dulles

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles, spoke to Agency personnel at the Tenth Agency Orientation Course on 8 May 1953.
2. It is believed that Mr. Dulles' remarks and his answers to questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.
3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circulation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.



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MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

Attachment: 1

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REMARKS OF
ALLEN W. DULLES
AT THE
TENTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE

8 May 1953

* * * * *

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am deeply touched by your welcome. This is the first time I have had the honor of addressing you as the Director of Central Intelligence. The last time I was here, I was on the verge of it, but I had not yet been confirmed and taken over my office. As far as I know, I am here from now on until they throw me out. I plan to devote the balance of my time to doing what I can to build up the Agency; to build up its esprit de corps, its morale, its effectiveness, and its place in the Government of the United States.

From time to time, I have received presents from visiting dignitaries, very small presents. The other day, I received rather an unusual one from the head of a friendly service. It was a long package which I opened in his presence. I was somewhat surprised to find that the present was a boomerang. I asked him whether he thought I should accept the boomerang as the emblem of office. He said, "Oh, this boomerang is all right. It only comes back half way." I have adopted the symbol of the "boomerang-only-comes-back-half-way" for the moment. Occasionally I find the boomerang comes back all the way. But we're trying to cut down the number of occasions when that happens.

In my experience in intelligence work, I have been impressed with two primary factors: one is the character of personnel; the other is the training that such personnel receive. There is no alternative, no substitute for either. Intelligence, above all professions, is no assembly-line business. It requires unique attributes of mind and character. I hope to do everything possible to try to find out, with the help of those working with me, who among you (and I hope it will be practically all of you) have those attributes of mind, ingenuity, resourcefulness, perseverance, and patience, which are the essence of a good intelligence officer.

One of the hardest things in intelligence work, for Americans particularly, is the question of security. I realize many of your problems in explaining to outsiders what you do--how in your ordinary social life can you appear to tell what you are doing without really doing so?--and I've been looking into that because I don't think as yet we've handled that properly. I hope to get out some other regulations on this subject, as soon as we've explored it further, because I think there have been a good deal too many rigid rules without the flexibility that is necessary to permit you to be natural in your ordinary contacts without giving away any of the secrets of your work. In the work I

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did in Switzerland, I found that it was very desirable to have a perfectly legitimate and natural story; it was a little bit near the truth, but it put the inquirer off on the wrong scent. If I had tried to pretend that I was doing something totally different from what I was doing, I never would have gotten away with it.

I plan to do everything I can to build up CIA as a career service. It is not easy, but it is possible. We've already made real strides in that direction. Intelligence is a kind of career in which satisfaction has to come largely from the work itself. But I can assure you that in the long run, that is the greatest satisfaction one gets out of any career. It's not the ephemeral self-advertisement that one may get.

We are working now in the most difficult era that intelligence has ever known. It was child's play to get intelligence during the war compared to getting intelligence today from behind the Iron Curtain. There are new difficulties because some of the most important targets are in the scientific and technical fields, which makes it harder and harder for the ordinary individual to be able to operate. But that difficulty is, and must remain, a challenge to us all.

I can assure you that intelligence in this government has come of age; it has found its position; its importance is recognized; it is being supported. Each week, I give the intelligence briefing for the National Security Council; that privilege, which I exercise to some extent on behalf of the intelligence community indicates the importance which the highest officials of government place on the intelligence phase of their work. Policy cannot be established firmly unless it is established on the basis of fact.

Finally, I want to say that, as your Director, I propose to see that the rights of the individual employee are protected and I shall see to it as a high privilege and a high duty.

I was told that really what you wanted today was to fire some questions at me. I'll do my best to answer all your questions, but if any of them are not answerable, I shall see that they are referred to our very able Inspector General for study and later answer.

Question: How do you evaluate the present intelligence support that we are giving to the National Security Council? Is it as good as you would like to have it?

Answer: If we are ever satisfied with our intelligence coverage, then something is wrong.. One never has all the facts; all one can do is approximate. I won't say that I am wholly satisfied, because if I were satisfied, then I would not be urging on to even greater efforts those who are furnishing the information. No, I'm not wholly satisfied, but I feel that, given our capabilities, we are giving the National Security Council a good coverage of fact on the basis of which to firm up policy.

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Question: In view of the fact that most well-known Republicans are known for their rather conservative viewpoints relative to world affairs, in your opinion will these conservative leanings have any effect upon our estimating function?

Answer: If we allow ourselves to be influenced in our estimating by political or other considerations such as right-wing or left-wing tendencies, then we are failing in our work. Politics plays no role in this Agency. Anybody that wants to get into politics actively or to have any political activity, had better leave, right away quick, because I won't tolerate that; I won't allow myself to do it; I won't allow anybody else to do it while in the Agency. Obviously, you can exercise your right to vote, but I don't want politics coming into this Agency. We're going to keep this Agency out of politics, as far as I'm concerned, and we're going to keep politics out of our estimating.

Question: The CIA organization is functional, but 90% of our problems are regional and deal with capabilities or intentions of particular countries. Wouldn't we, therefore, be better off with a regional set-up so that we could go to one place for the answer to the average question instead of going to half a dozen functional places at the present time?

Answer: Well, I don't think one has to go to half a dozen. I do often find that I go to two places. Let's take a question like Iran. I want to get ideas about Iran from the fellow that is carrying on the operations in that area, collecting intelligence from that area, and then I also want to get, as a check on him, the views of the person who is studying reports and looking at the problem in the broad perspective. I find that if I get those two angles on the subject, I am pretty well advised as to what the situation is. Now I realize that there are many elements that feed up to each of those two individuals, let us say, in his own side of the shop. I don't think you could wisely put those two sides of the shop together, because the operational fellow tends to have an operational view of things, and it's well to temper that with the view of the person who looks at it from the broad historical and research angle.

Question: Would you say that the Central Intelligence Agency will be a permanent governmental function, even if the USSR has a modified change of heart and begins to behave itself?

Answer: I think the CIA is here to stay. I don't think there's any slight doubt on that point. I've had a great deal of contact during these last few weeks with the Congress and every once in a while we get a bit of criticism here and there, but I have never run into anybody in Congress who indicates that the CIA ought to be abolished or done away with or radically changed. Now, we've drawn up a lot of estimates with regard to the peace offensive of the Soviet leaders. In all of them, we have gone back to the words of Lenin, repeated many times by Stalin, that while changes

of tactics and strategic retreats are permissible, just as permissible as advances, the basic policy remains. I don't think, therefore, you need expect, much as we might like it, that this peace offensive will change in any way the workload of this Agency, or its importance.

Question: Do you contemplate any new organizational changes in the Agency?

Answer: I do not for the immediate future. We've gone through a lot of organizational changes. Those were very largely patterned on a report that three of us prepared and submitted several years ago, the Jackson-Correa-Dulles report, that was adopted by the NSC. By and large, the recommendations of that report are carried out in the present organization and I think the thing to do now is to go ahead with the organization that we have and let time tell us whether any further changes or adjustments are necessary.

Question: Is there a movement afoot at the present time, as the press indicates, to sever overt functions from covert functions in CIA?

Answer: I do not believe that that is at all likely. You have probably read in the press about the President's Committee on Informational Activities, I believe it is called--somewhat of a cover name, because that Committee, presided over by Mr. William Jackson, will also deal with the relationship in government of our own activities. We have been in very close touch with that Committee throughout its work. Our representatives have appeared before it. And I would doubt that its report would effect any substantial organizational changes in so far as the relationship of overt and covert intelligence is concerned in our Agency.

Question: Do you feel that in the long run the PM type of operation belongs in an agency like this?

Answer: It is my view that this government cannot effectively carry on covert operations through two different agencies with different controls. It is hard enough to get one covert apparatus organized and functioning in the foreign field. If we had two trying to do it, I think that it would be extremely difficult. The British had this same problem before them when, during the war, they had their covert operations in two different baskets, and they found that wisdom dictated that they be put together. I'm inclined to think that our covert operations should remain under one leadership and that it would be very difficult to separate secret intelligence from secret, covert operations. On the other hand, I do believe that there are certain paramilitary activities which may reach a volume and scope that they belong rather in the Pentagon than with us, and that is a problem which is now under consideration.

Question: Would you please comment upon a recent editorial in the public press which implied that CIA's clandestine activities imperiled the orderly development of the U.S. foreign policy?

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Answer: I don't agree with the editorial. I think I know the one you refer to. We have quite a problem in dealing with the press. It's more or less my policy to take it in my stride, not to get too excited about it. We're going to be attacked from time to time. If we start to answer attacks directly, even false attacks, I think we'll get ourselves into a lot of trouble. If we answer the false attacks and don't answer the other attacks, then we might be deemed to be confirming certain allegations made about us. I believe in maintaining very friendly relations with the press. I think I have very good relations personally with a large number of people of the press, but I don't propose to get into any newspaper controversies.

Question: In these days of economy, do you feel that CIA could stand a reduction in force without a marked decrease in efficiency?

Answer: In certain areas, yes. I'd like to see us somewhat smaller than we are today. But I don't think that we can do much on that immediately. I think as we all get more professional, we can possibly reduce our numbers. I'm a great believer in small, efficient, well-knit organizations where we don't have too much paper work and where we can put our minds to doing the essential thing that is to be done.

Question: When do we get a new building?

Answer: That's on the very top of the basket. I have canvassed the situation in the Bureau of the Budget; I have canvassed the situation among the Congressional leaders. I find everyone sympathetic, but the question is, what to do. There are two possibilities: one is to find an existing building from which we could oust the present occupants on the theory of the higher sensitivity of our work, and the other is to get the authority and money to build a new building. We're working along both of those lines, and it is the highest priority that I have, because I realize the conditions under which you work.

Question: Is the abundance of military personnel necessary in a civilian organization?

Answer: The percentage of military personnel with us is relatively low, about 10%. I consider them an extremely valuable and indispensable addition to our staff. We have some of the ablest men in the armed services working for us and with us. And I wouldn't change that in any respect. We have very important responsibilities to the armed services in the field of intelligence. Take the situation in Korea today. If we weren't equipped to go in there and work with the armed services and very largely by the use of the people that we have from the armed services, we wouldn't be able to do our job. No, I don't think we have too many. The percentage is about right. I think the caliber is very high.

Question: (1) Why are women hired at a lower grade than men? (2) Do you think that women are given sufficient recognition in the Central Intelligence

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Security Information

Agency? (3) And as the new Director of CIA, are you going to do something about the professional discrimination against women?

Answer: That first question I'll refer to the Inspector General for a report as to whether the facts are true. As to the second question I am inclined to think that they are not. And the third one: If it exists, I shall. I'll give that to the Inspector General too, and get a report on it. I'm serious about this. I think women have a very high place in this work, and if there is discrimination, we're going to see that it's stopped.

Question: You stated upon becoming the Director of Central Intelligence that you'd make every effort to meet as many employees as possible on the "working level." How successful have you been?

Answer: I haven't been very successful so far, but I'm going to be. As you know, there was quite a long while before General Cabell came on board and took over as Deputy. Then with the change of administration there was a tremendous amount of briefing to do. The new officials of government had to be briefed about our activities. The new work of the National Security Council, which is very important, takes a vast amount of time--far more time than it did in the past--because of the briefing that I referred to and because of certain new activities of the National Security Council. So that during the last two or three months, I can assure you that I've been pretty busy. Now General Cabell is on board and I think we're getting the administrative organization working more smoothly and I can assure you that before the temperature gets to 110 in your buildings I'm going to visit them. Try to keep the temperature down.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF TRAINING

TRAINING BULLETIN

NUMBER 2

4 March 1953

SUBJECT : Training of CIA Personnel at Department of Defense Schools
and Colleges

25X1
REFERENCE :

1. It is the policy of the Director of Central Intelligence that any individual in the Agency who meets the required qualifications shall have the opportunity to apply for training in the various Department of Defense schools and colleges.

2. Agency quotas for training in the various schools and colleges have been established, and selection of applicants to fill quotas is made by the Director of Central Intelligence and by Selection Boards acting under the chairmanship of the Director of Training.

3. Information with respect to the various schools and colleges, the qualifications required for training in each, and the procedure for application may be found in CIA Regulations 25-4 and 110-25-4.

4. Suspense dates for the receipt of applications in the Office of Training are as follows:

1 April: National War College

5 April: Strategic Intelligence School
Counter Intelligence Corps School

10 April: Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Army War College
Naval War College
Air War College

24 April: Armed Forces Staff College
Intelligence Staff Officers Course,
Air Command and Staff School
Naval Intelligence School

5. Further information may be obtained from [REDACTED]
Room 1303 I Building, extension 2761.

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[REDACTED]

MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

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Distribution #5

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